Many geographers, political scientists, and other social scientists share a common interest in regional environmental governance (REG). 1 Yet, one of the most striking features of the work of such analysts is the huge diversity in the ways they refer to the notion of region. Indeed, the only common ground of such discussions is to focus on a special kind of spatial entity-supranational or transnational ones.
kinds. Some refer to natural regions (such as the Alps for Balsiger, the Mekong River basin for Elliott, the Indus River basin for Matthew, the Great Lakes water basin for Klinke), which seem to indicate that the regions exist prior to any attempt to set up institutionalized governance at this level. Some are supranational organizations (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Elliott's paper, the European Union in Balsiger's) , and have developed a moreor-less ambitious agenda for dealing with environmental issues. Some are decentralized afªliates of global organizations (regional centers of the Basel and Stockholm Conventions in Selin's paper). Some (e.g. Klinke) are social conªgurations shaped by collective mobilization or public participation, if not collective identities; and some combine different kinds of regions or regional entities. The Balsiger and Elliott papers, for example, focus on the will or capacity of regional organizations to take into account environmental issues at the level of natural entities that are deªned according to natural scientiªc knowledge (such as watersheds and mountain ranges).
Such ontological and epistemological variety in the term "region" illustrates the potential for adopting a regional point of view in environmental governance analysis. It is part of the internal diversity of what deserves to be seen as a speciªc subªeld of knowledge. But the notions of region and regionality remain vague, which is somehow paradoxical for a research ªeld that explicitly refers to these terms. We may guess that in most cases, if not in all, regions are socially constructed, but we could expect to know more about the constructions themselves, as well as how regionality as such is constructed.
In my view, making explicit the ontological and epistemological basis of REG analysis is not a matter of deªnition. Geographers know how timeconsuming and fruitless attempts to precisely deªne the term region have been. We can survive quite well with the simple idea that a region is a spatial entity at a particular level, even if we regret the lack of academic consensus on whether that level is subnational, supranational, or transnational. The question, What is a region? (environmental/eco/etc.) merely requires an arbitrary consensus. Another question, How is a region? deserves much more attention, because it forces us to make explicit the ontological status of a regional entity. This second question points at a region's mode of existence and determines what can be said about it by REG analysis. In other words, as this commentary will explain, answering the how question highlights the way REG analysis is made and justiªed.
The following paragraphs discuss some issues related to the ontological or epistemological status of regionality in REG analysis. This perspective owes a lot to vigorous debates that have taken place in some academic domains during the last three decades, especially in the so-called politics of scale, new regional geography, and political ecology domains.
2 It will suggest that political science, international relations, and geography have much to learn from one another around their shared interest in regionality.
Regional Scope Versus Scope of Regionality
There is a major difference between the concept of regional scope, such as the one adopted by Matthew's analysis of South Asia in this issue, and that of scope of regionality used by other authors in this issue, such as Elliott when she refers to Southeast Asia. Regional scope refers to a kind of epistemic and methodological artifact used to spatially frame the area of analysis. Many papers analyzing environmental governance with an ad hoc spatial focus (Central Europe, Southern Africa, etc.) proceed in this way. Elliott, for instance, questions the will and ability of a regional institution-the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-to tackle environmental issues, notably watershed management. For her and similar writers, regionality is not an element of an epistemic posture, but a component of an ontological statement; it refers to regional entities (the overall territory of ASEAN member states, watersheds, and some others), which are considered part of the reality itself.
Is Regionality a Feature of Ontological Subjectivity or Objectivity?
To what kind of reality does this second kind of paper refer? When Elliott and Balsiger examine the way ASEAN and the EU cope with environmental issues, they point at regional institutions and organizations. Following philosophers such as John R. Searle, 3 both can be said to be ontologically subjective: the existence of institutions and organizations such as ASEAN and the EU, but also the Alpine Convention or the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, requires some degree of intersubjectivity, trust, and legitimacy. From this point of view, there is a difference between these entities and the regional centers of the Basel and Stockholm Conventions examined by Selin. These regional centers are organizations whose corresponding institutions (both conventions) are speciªcally global.
Comparatively, the Alps (Balsiger), the Great Lakes water basin (Klinke), the Mekong River basin (Elliott), and the Himalayas (Matthew) have what Searle calls ontological objectivity. Their mode of existence (the kind of reality these entities refer to) does not depend on individuals or societies.
Are Environmental Regions Parts of the Objective World?
We need to be very precise about what objectivity means. Does ontological objectivity refer to a set of entities (such as natural regions) and statements related to them (such as causal relations between water ºow and forest cover) that belong to the real world? This highly realist posture has been undermined by history-of-science studies and challenged by epistemic constructivism. Scholars of the history of science 4 have shown that natural areas have been conceived and deªned in very different ways through time. Since the early twentieth century, proponents of epistemic constructivism 5 have shown that entities deªned by scientiªc knowledge cannot pretend to be the pieces that comprise the real world. These entities are scientiªc conventions that provide efªcient models of observed reality. They are entities of knowledge rather than of reality itself. Following such a constructivist epistemology, it is no use to build on the idea that some natural areas/entities could preexist any process of objectiªcation. Natural areas are not entities to be recognized or uncovered by scientiªc processes; they are the intentional output of the differentiation of the Earth's surface and of a scale-making process aiming at greater intelligibility.
Ignoring or Questioning Social Ontologies
REG analysis can reasonably ignore the above comments if it sticks to a formal analysis of, let's say, institutional arrangements, policy-making, or bilateral treaties. Thus it can take for granted entities (national territories, natural areas, supranational institutions, etc.) referred to by social actors, as do most social actors themselves. This is the dominant posture in this special issue.
But REG analysis could also build on these inputs and question the very nature of and relations between the various ontologies at work in regionalized social worlds. In a recent work devoted to mountain regions and policies, I have tried to follow how and when mountain ranges-as conventionally deªned and conceived by natural scientists-have been used for grounding collective identities, public policies, and politics. 6 This has happened only thanks to the growing conªdence in scientiªc knowledge and a growing social demand for a naturebased vision of the world and of environmental management. Therefore, a decisive question for such analysis is to determine how social actors seize scientiªc knowledge and translate scientiªc ontologies into social ontologies. Pierre Livet and Ruwen Ogien say, "to ask questions of ontology, is simply to wonder what kind of entities are summoned when someone talks about something, or describes and explains a phenomenon, (. . .) what operations are possible on these entities, and what allows transformations from one entity to another." 7 But scientiªc ontologies and social ontologies are of a different kind, motivated by different intentionalities, and produced according to different processes. Therefore, REG analysis, when referring to the spatial entities of the world of environmental governance, faces an alternative: either refer to taken-forgranted ontologies (regional organizations, conventional entities of natural scientists, imagined regional communities, etc.); or analyze how these regional entities are built or reinforced in the various ontologies at play, how these ontologies interact, and how these factors eventually lead to various kinds of environmental governance.
Is the Study of Regionality Itself a Social Issue?
This commentary invites us to pay speciªc attention to the social and political modalities and implications of the tendency of modern societies to conºate scientiªc and social ontologies. One fascinating example is the notion of ecoregions used by WWF. The term is ofªcially implied to be borrowed from scientiªc knowledge: "An ecoregion is deªned as a large area of land or water that contains a geographically distinct assemblage of natural communities that (a) share a large majority of their species and ecological dynamics; (b) share similar environmental conditions, and (c) interact ecologically in ways that are critical for their long-term persistence." 8 But in fact, WWF also uses the concept of ecoregion as a systematic tool for organizing political action on a regional basis. This conºation reveals an interesting normative conception of the spatial frame of action, which refers to imagined nature as a driving force for shaping policies.
The examples discussed in this commentary also invite REG analysts to pay attention to how regional ontologies are put on stage, disputed, or negotiated, and thus constitute a decisive element of consensus building or conºict in environmental governance. Arturo Escobar provides an example of how different actors can adopt a common reference to a biogeographical area in Colombia usually called Paciªco biogeograªco. Whereas global NGOs are motivated by biodiversity conservation in this region, local people (predominantly descendants of slaves) seize on the same spatial entity for demanding ofªcial recognition because of their role in ecosystem stewardship. 9 Klinke's analysis of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement illustrates how stakeholders reach consensus on a spatial entity and the environmental threats and solutions that pertain to this entity.
On the other hand, Balsiger's paper displays how the identiªcation of a regional entity to be selected for environmental governance can be controversial because of divergent interests and visions of regional issues; a narrow delineation of the Alps as deªned by the Alpine Convention, promoted by environmental associations and national ministries of environment, is being challenged by a larger delineation, that of a macroregional strategy promoted by subnational political entities (länder, provinces, cantons, etc.) .
Such convergences or controversies remind us to consider the lessons emerging from the academic study of the so-called politics of scale, which suggest that scale "is not simply an external fact awaiting discovery but a way of framing conceptions of reality" and that "the politics of scale may often take the form of contending 'framings.'" 10 This should be kept in mind in REG analysis: ecoregional entities invoked by various stakeholders are also ways of framing geographical and natural reality, and can be objects of potential controversy when stakeholders do not share the same mode of framing. 
Is Region a Category of Knowledge or of Social Practice?
The diversity of conceptions of regionality that underlies REG analysis leads to a ªnal set of questions: Is regionality a category of knowledge, and if so, what kind of knowledge? Or is it conceived as a category of social practice? Most papers in REG analysis do not provide clear answers to this, probably because regionality is paradoxically not at the very heart of their focus.
In this domain, regional geography has experienced a dramatic shift since the 1980s. The notion of region, central in the discipline's vocabulary since the early decades of the twentieth century, used to be conceived as a category of objectivist scientiªc knowledge. The so-called 'new regional geography' (NRG), as well as earlier publications such as by Armand Frémont and Wilbur Zelinsky, made their own the constructivist turn of the time, even though their reference to regions as a category of social practice, i.e. of social and practical ontology, was only implicit. 11 One of the most quoted NRG authors, Anssi Paasi, conceives of regions as the output of "historically contingent social processes emerging as a constellation of institutionalized practices, power relations and discourse." 12 REG analysis usually refers to regional entities as being both components of scientiªc knowledge and referents of social practices. This may blur the message on regionality. Brubaker and Cooper suggested that the notion of identity, having too many heterogeneous meanings, could not refer at the same time to a social notion and a scientiªc concept. 13 Adam Moore adopted the argument for the notion of scale; he recommended keeping the notion as a category of social and political practice-a way of framing-and to get rid of it in the academic conceptual vocabulary, where it usually refers to "a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces." 14 Therefore, to ensure that the critical analysis of social practices and norms remains possible, Moore recommended focusing on "scalar practices of social actors," where "the tendency to partition the social world into hierarchically ordered spatial 'containers' is what we want to explain-not explain things with." 15 Following both arguments on identity and scale, I wonder if "region" as used in REG analysis should be reserved for describing how social actors and organizations make use of it. This does not mean that these regions have no real existence by themselves. Regions of regional governance are real as long as social actors shape them as relevant frames for action and build institutions accordingly. REG analysis focuses on regional institutions that shape social reality and, potentially, material reality (through spatial transformation such as water or biodiversity management). This is how Pierre Bourdieu shaped his own understanding of the making of social reality: social categories-such as family or marriage, but also regions in the French context-are institutionalizing frames for societies and, in the case of regions, for their social spaces. 16
Conclusion: It's Good to Think about Regions
REG analysis displays a wide diversity of conceptions of regionality. This is no problem at all as long as this diversity is clearly understood and motivated. There is no reason in my view for discarding ontological/epistemological pluralism in favor of one single approach. However, authors focusing on REG should be explicit about the way they conceive of regionality. If they do not, they risk undermining the relevance of such a focus and blurring the message. This would make it difªcult to build a common or shared knowledge about the added value of focusing on the regional level in environmental governance. After all, if REG analysis wishes to become a space of dialogue among othersmaybe a "knowledge region" where political science, international relations, and geography could gain from shared interest on regionality, knowledge building and identity-it would certainly gain strength, and clarify at the same time why the notion of region merits reºection.
